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ABSTRACT
The models of direct and deliberative democracy are broadly
considered the major alternatives to representative democracy. So
far, the two models have been merged under the broad umbrella
of participatory democracy and thus little is known about why
citizens support direct democracy and/or deliberation. They are
distinct procedures, driven by different logics and outcomes and
this makes it likely that the preference for them rest on different
premises. This article fills this gap in the literature and
distinguishes between the models proposing two central
arguments. First, we expect that several general determinants
have a positive impact on the support for both direct democracy
and deliberation because they are different from representative
democracy. Second, we test the effect of specific determinants
that drive people towards supporting more one of the two
alternative models of democracy. We use individual level data
from an original survey conducted in December 2018 on a
representative sample of 1094 respondents in the UK. The results
indicate that the supporters of direct democracy differ from those
of deliberative democracy in several ways.
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The flaws of contemporary representative democracies have determined citizens and poli-
ticians to look for alternatives. An extensive body of literature acknowledges the various
demands of citizens and focuses on their preferences for alternative models of political
decision-making (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Esaiasson, Gilljam, and Persson 2012;
Bengtsson and Christensen 2016; Gherghina and Geissel 2017). This coincides with a
momentum gained by participatory institutions and procedures in real-life politics. In
the last three decades, an increasing number of countries introduced direct democratic
procedures to enable citizens to make final political decisions (Scarrow 2001; Gherghina
2017). Other countries use deliberative procedures to enhance the quality of decisions,
e.g. Iceland and Ireland with their constitutional conventions (Farrell, O’Malley, and
Suiter 2013; Reuchamps and Suiter 2016). A recent study shows that many countries
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choose between these two forms of participatory institutions – direct democracy or delib-
eration – rather than using both (Geissel and Michels 2018).
So far, the functioning and consequences of these two forms of participatory democ-
racy have been intensely documented (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009; Webb 2013; Coffé
and Michels 2014; Font, Wojcieszak, and Navarro 2015; Caluwaerts et al. 2018). The prefer-
ences for different forms of participation have been explored and described in detail, with
emphasis on trends, general meaning and relationship to political participation (Bengts-
son and Christensen 2016; Gherghina and Geissel 2017; Landwehr and Steiner 2017).
Several studies went one step further and sought to identify what triggers the demand
for referendums as the most common form of direct democracy (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 2002; Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2007; Anderson and Goodyear-Grant 2010;
Qvortrup 2014). More recently, citizens’ initiatives were included in analyses next to refer-
endums, thus providing a fuller understanding of citizens’ preferences for direct democ-
racy (Gherghina and Geissel 2019).
In spite of this broad coverage, little is known about why citizens support direct
democracy and / or deliberation. They are distinct procedures, driven by different
logics and outcomes, and this makes it likely that the preference for them rest on
different premises. And yet many studies collate the two under the broader umbrella
of participatory democracy, while others analyse them separately. One notable exception
to this rule is the study of Landwehr and Faas (2015) who compare the two forms (see
below). One explanation for this limited comparison is the scarcity of comparative data.
For example, international surveys such as World Value Survey and the Eurobarometer
have included questions on preferences for direct democracy, but they lack the delibera-
tion component. To address this gap in the literature, this article aims to answer the fol-
lowing research question: Why do citizens’ support direct democracy and/or deliberative
procedures?
Our quest for an answer relies on individual level data from an original survey conducted
in December 2018 on a representative sample of 1094 respondents in the UK. We formulate
and test empirically two central arguments. First, we argue that several general determinants
such as interest in politics, consumption of political news, internal efficacy and dissatisfaction
with institutions of representative democracy have a positive impact on the support for both
direct democracy and deliberation. Second, there are specific determinants that drive
people towards supporting more one of the two alternative models of democracy. Apart
from their common shared idea of involving citizens in the decision-making process,
direct democracy rests on different principles than deliberative democracy and for this
reason we expect support to be triggered by different variables.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the litera-
ture explaining citizens’ preferences for participatory procedures in general and formu-
lates four testable hypotheses. Next, we review the studies discussing citizens’
preferences for direct democratic versus deliberative procedures formulate two further
testable hypotheses for each of these two major forms of participation. The third
section describes our research design, followed by a section on empirical analysis and
interpretation of results. The conclusion summarizes the main findings and discusses
broader implications for the study of citizens’ attitudes towards participatory decision-
making.1
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Citizens’ support for direct and deliberative procedures
This section reviews the literature seeking to explain the preferences of citizens for parti-
cipatory procedures as alternatives to the purely representative form of democracy. The
debate on preferences for alternative models of democracy has been shaped by two
major analytical approaches. The first approach rests on the question, if the dissatisfied
and less educated citizens favour direct democratic decision-making more than those citi-
zens who are politically interested and educated (Donovan and Karp 2006). The second
approach builds on the dichotomy between enraged (dissatisfied) and engaged citizens
to understand the preference for participatory democracy (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp
2007). In essence, these two approaches point in the direction of the following key deter-
minants: interest in politics, consumption of political news and satisfaction with insti-
tutions of representative democracy. We add internal efficacy due to its crucial
importance for participation, which can intuitively also influence preferences for participa-
tory democracy. This intuition is supported by existing research in the fields of political
attitudes and political participation.
We build an integrative theoretical framework that proposes testable hypotheses with
four crucial determinants: interest in politics, the consumption of political news, internal
efficacy and dissatisfaction with the institutions of representative democracy. We test
for the effects of these variables on preferences for both direct and deliberative pro-
cedures, because they refer to general participatory preferences, i.e. for non-representative
forms of government. We use these predictors because they are applicable to both direct
and deliberative democracy.
Interest in politics is a crucial predictor for political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady 1995; Norris 2000; Christensen 2017) and also for participatory preferences. The logic
behind this relationship is that citizen, who care about what happens in politics, do actively
engage in it. Citizens with political interest are more willing to have a greater say in the
political will-formation and decision-making process. This mechanism most likely trans-
lates to the relationship between interest and preferences: ‘citizens with greater interest
in politics may… desire greater participatory democracy’ (Donovan and Karp 2006,
872). Several studies show that people with high interest in politics are more interested
in having more say in politics, wish to have an active role in the world of politics and
embrace participatory democracy (Donovan and Karp 2006; Bowler, Donovan, and Karp
2007). In this context, the literature also refers to the increase of post-materialist values
in advanced societies, which includes not only enhanced political interest but also goes
hand in hand with an increased ‘desire for a more participatory role in politics’ (Bowler,
Donovan, and Karp 2007, 354). Participatory procedures can be expected to be valued
by citizens with post-materialist values, who at the same time are also more interested
in politics than their fellow citizens. Some authors nuanced this perspective and argued
that disinterested citizens are more inclined to support direct democracy, because they
do not want to spend too much time with politics. Highly interested citizens may prefer
deliberation because it allows them to understand a political issue in more detail (Bengts-
son and Mattila 2009).
Internal efficacy has been also considered a potential factor. Its relationship with politi-
cal behaviour is widely acknowledged (Finkel 1985; Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens 2000;
Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009; Jung, Kim, and de Zúñiga 2011). For
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example, highly efficacious citizens are more likely to vote than others. The logic behind
this relationship is that citizens’ confidence in their ability to participate provides people
incentives to get involved. Similarly, it is reasonable to argue that citizens with strong feel-
ings of internal efficacy are likely to be more supportive towards participatory procedures
that open up new possibilities for involvement in political will-formation and decision-
making. Surprisingly, there are only few studies examining the effects of internal
efficacy on participatory preferences. Some studies examine whether direct democratic
options and procedures enhance internal efficacy (Dyck and Lascher 2009), but only
few works look at the effects of internal efficacy on participatory preferences. One of
the studies on participatory preferences indicate that German citizens with high internal
efficacy show more support for both forms of participatory democracy (Landwehr and
Faas 2015, 14).
The dissatisfaction with institutions of representative democracy has been for a long
time one of the usual suspects when speaking about preferences for alternative participa-
tory models of democracy. The flaws of representative democracy have determined an
increasing number of citizens to voice their discontent. Over time, citizens have
become more critical and more demanding towards the system of political representation
(Norris 2011). The inability of the system to solve its problems and to cope with citizens’
interests and demands have triggered a desire to look for alternatives within the demo-
cratic realm rather than contesting the system overall. In line with this reasoning, research
shows that citizens who are dissatisfied with the institutions of representative democracy
are more likely to prefer participatory options (Dalton, Burklin, and Drummond 2001;
Bengtsson and Mattila 2009; Christensen 2017; Gherghina and Geissel 2019). There are
some contradictory findings according to which citizens with trust in institutions of repre-
sentative democracy are stronger supporters of participatory procedures (Bowler,
Donovan, and Karp 2007). However, the mixed evidence appears to have more methodo-
logical roots rather than theoretical or substantial reasons: the studies refer to different
institutions and people, mixing for example trust in government, parliament, parties
and politicians, which are quite different and can have separate effects (Gherghina and
Geissel 2019). Overall, it is unanimously accepted that the level of (dis-)satisfaction with
various institutions of representative democracy has an effect on participatory
preferences.
In this article, we differentiate between the legislature and the executive because they
have specific roles and the dissatisfaction of citizens can get specific meanings. In a repre-
sentative democracy the parliament is the arena for debating and deciding upon legislation.
The theory of political representation explains how elected politicians are supposed to get
together and produce the most appropriate laws for the societal development. In reality,
there are many instances in which the laws are delayed, contested, the result of compromise
or inappropriate for certain segments of society. When citizens are not convinced about the
ability of this institution tomake laws, they could look for alternatives. Direct democracy may
be one of the alternatives preferred since it involves citizens directly in the decision-making
process, bypasses parliamentary debates and provides a non-mediated translation of prefer-
ences into policies (Setala and Schiller 2012; Altman 2018). The deliberative procedures can
also be an important alternative because they develop new ideas, bring information into the
will-formation process, or provide suggestions for broadly accepted solutions (Gutmann and
Thompson 2004; Warren and Pearse 2008; Reuchamps and Suiter 2016). Both alternatives
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provide a relevant voice to citizens and diminish the influence of an institution – the parlia-
ment – in the decision-making process.
The government has the executive functions of initiating legislation and the implemen-
tation of policies and decisions. While citizens may be content with parliamentary law
making and decision-making processes, dissatisfaction could arise from the ways in
which these decisions are put into practice. People may have an issue with the pace
and the form of the implementation process, government priorities and so on. For the
reasons outlined above, both direct and deliberative democracy provide useful avenues
to address the problem that citizens have with the government. For example, citizens
who wish to have a new policy do not have to wait for the government to schedule its
initiation and implementation. Instead, a citizens’ initiative or a referendum could place
that policy on the agenda at a much faster pace and without all the trouble associated
to the executive process.
Following all these arguments we expect that the support for participatory democracy,
i.e. both direct and deliberative procedures, is driven by the following variables:
H1: Political interest drives support for participatory democracy.
H2: Internal efficacy support for participatory democracy.
H3: Doubts on Parliament as best arena for decision-making support for participatory
democracy.
H4: Dissatisfaction with the government support for participatory democracy.
Citizens’ support for direct vs deliberative procedures
We turn now to the differences between the preference for direct vs deliberative pro-
cedures. The two are different institutions. Direct democracy can be defined as ‘a publicly
recognized, institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their
choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot with universal and secret suffrage’
(Altman 2018, 6). It rests on the idea that citizens have an equal input into the collective
decision-making (Saward 1998). This input shifts the control from politicians to citizens
and provides the possibility for larger acceptance of decisions in society. Any changes
occurring through direct democracy are often easier accepted if debates and decisions
involve the citizenry rather than being limited to the political elites (Gherghina 2017). In
essence, direct democracy is about the direct impact of ordinary citizens on political
decisions, which can take place either through voting on policies or through the
support of citizens’ initiatives (Setala and Schiller 2012). The referendums and citizens’
initiatives are the most common forms of direct democracy. The referendums follow
the logic of ‘aggregating votes’ as the main mechanism of decision-making and create
winners. They can create important divisions in society especially when the issue is
salient in society (e.g. Brexit).
Deliberative democracy is based on the idea that the individual and collective exchange
of reasoned arguments and public debates precede decisions. It marks the shift from a
vote-centric to a talk-centric conception of democracy (Chambers 2003). According to
this understanding, ‘the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legit-
imate political decision making and self-government’ (Bohman 1998, 401). Deliberation
POLITICAL RESEARCH EXCHANGE 5
involves key components such as respectful communication and conversation, confronta-
tion with different opinions and experiences with the aim of finding the best argument
(Fishkin 2011). The key concept behind deliberation is that citizens’ interactions in delib-
erative procedures may improve both the epistemic and the ethical quality of the choices
made (Habermas 1996; Dryzek 2000). The quality of decisions and individual preferences
can change when people provide considered judgments and engage in communication
(Smith 2009). The literature refers to two major types of deliberation.
There is a traditional Habermasian perspective that focuses on consensus. It emphasizes
the exchange of rational arguments and the search for the common good. The alternative
is a type of deliberation that is open to various modes of communication (e.g. stories, tes-
timonies) in order to adapt the ideal of deliberation to the real world (Bächtiger et al. 2010).
The two major forms of deliberation are the mini-publics and participatory budgeting. The
latter has a strong component of public deliberation in which citizens are involved at the
regular meetings about the budget (Sintomer, Röcke, and Herzberg 2016). The delibera-
tion is aimed both at informing participants about the process and available resources
and at debating about specific projects (Baiocchi and Ganuza 2014).
These features indicate clear differences in the aims, functioning and consequences of
direct and deliberative democracy. Direct democracy often aims at producing a change in
society and is oriented towards reaching decisions. Deliberative procedures are set for a
variety of different purposes and are highly heterogenous (Esau, Fleuß, and Nienhaus
2020). While they might fulfil different functions also for democratic-decision-making,
they usually do not have the power to make final political decisions. In addition, they
require different citizens’ competence: direct democratic procedures are characterized
by limited citizen involvement, while ‘deliberative practices attract knowledgeable and
motivated citizens willing to invest time in assemblies or town meetings’ (Font, Wojcies-
zak, and Navarro 2015, 155). In spite of these differences, there are some instances in
which participatory procedures may combine deliberative and direct democratic
elements. For example, in some countries, the participatory budgeting procedures
based on some kind of deliberative citizens’ assemblies, can unfold decisive aspects.
Another example is the participatory process that includes a combination of deliberation
and referendum, in this order (e.g. Ireland).
In general, direct democratic and deliberative procedures follow different logics,
require different levels and types of citizens’ engagement and focus either on decision-
making (direct democracy) or political will-formation (deliberation). These differences indi-
cate that there are good reasons to expect that these two forms of participatory pro-
cedures are favoured by different types of citizens. So far, very few empirical studies
tried to disentangle citizens’ support for direct versus deliberative procedures. The follow-
ing lines build arguments, explained below in detail, about how (1) doubts on politicians,
as decision-making actors, and experience with direct democracy may favour preferences
for direct democracy, and (2) civicness, which most likely entails an interest in discussion
and interaction, and experience with deliberative democracy may favour preferences for
deliberative democracy.
As previously explained, one of the main differences between direct democratic and
deliberative procedures is about who decides. Whereas deliberative procedures serve as
means for political will-formation with politicians remaining the decision-makers, direct
democratic procedures shift the decision-making power to the citizens. As such, we
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may expect the negative perceptions of politicians to influence the preferences for direct
democracy but to have little or no impact on citizens’ preference for deliberative democ-
racy. More precisely, if citizens do not trust politicians to act in the interest of people and
pursue own interests instead, they are likely to prefer direct democracy. This puts the
decision-making directly into the hands of the citizens themselves and takes it rightly
out of the hands of the politicians who are perceived as corrupt and incompetent.
Simply put, ‘people disenchanted with the performance of traditional representative insti-
tutions may… be expected to be more enthusiastic about direct democracy’ (Bowler,
Donovan, and Karp 2007, 253). Citizens, who doubt that politicians make decisions in
the interest of ‘the people’, are likely to favour direct democracy because they are more
inclined to take (major) decisions out of the hands of politicians. In contrast, supporters
for deliberative democracy may have more faith in politicians as ‘good’ decision-makers.
The latter are probably more willing to foster the deliberative process of politicians via
citizen deliberation, leaving the final decision to politicians.
The level of civic engagement is a well proven indicator for political participation
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Putnam 2000) and
we can expect a differentiated impact on direct vs deliberative democracy. Citizens
involved in (political or non-political) organizations usually have an intrinsic interest in col-
lective discussion and social interactions, which might involve a greater interest in delib-
erative procedures compared to not engaged fellow citizens. Through civic engagement
citizens get a sense of collective will formation within their communities which might
strengthen their preferences for deliberation (Leighley 1996). Many deliberative pro-
cedures are oriented towards addressing community problems and civically engaged citi-
zens might have experienced that these problems can be solved via communication and
discussion, i.e. deliberation. We argue that civically engaged citizens are more inclined
towards deliberative procedures because these create a broader sense of community
involvement and deliberation instead of majoritarian decision-making. The entire idea
of deliberation lies on the promotion of dialogue and exchange of ideas, with formats
of mini-publics aiming to reach agreement and to find solutions agreeable to the
participants.
Equally important, deliberative procedures are more demanding in terms of resources
to be allocated. Civically engaged people often know how to gain access to resources, how
to use them and how important they are in the entire process of generating changes. They
are likely to develop a positive attitude towards another community-oriented process, i.e.
deliberative procedures. In contrast, non-engaged citizens may prefer direct democratic
procedures because casting a ballot is less demanding. Direct democracy requires less
information and lower level of resources. Citizens, who are engaged in civil activities,
might also prefer to work together towards a common solution in case of divisive
issues. In contrast, non-engaged citizens might be less inclined to deliberate on controver-
sial topics, but to ‘get things decided’ by majority vote.
In addition to these, we expect experience with direct and deliberative procedures to
have a positive impact on citizens’ preferences for respective procedures. Wemight specu-
late that citizens, who have already taken part in a direct democratic or deliberative pro-
cedure, are more inclined to favour the respective options. Empirical studies provide a
more complex picture. Font and Navarro (2013) show that Spanish citizens with experi-
ence with local participatory procedures are less favourable for these options. Another
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study illustrates how skepticism towards participatory procedures can occur after the frus-
tration generated by personal experience in participation (Fernández-Martínez, García-
Espín, and Jiménez-Sánchez 2019). However, this skepticism is often due to frustrating
experiences with really existing processes and citizens are able to abstract from concrete
experience and still favour participatory procedures over purely representative democracy
(Levine and Nierras 2007). All in all, we can assume that experiences with direct democratic
and deliberative procedures most likely influence preferences, although the direction if
influence is not obvious.
Based on these considerations we expect the support for direct democracy to be rooted
in the following variables:
H5: Doubts on politicians’ public interests drives support for direct democracy.
H6: Experience with direct democracy drives support for direct democracy.
The support for deliberative democracy is likely to be driven by the following variables:
H7: Civic engagement drives support for deliberative democracy.
H8: Experience with deliberative democracy drives support for deliberative democracy.
Control variables
The analysis includes three control variables with potential impact on preferences for both
direct and deliberative democracy: consumption of political news, education and age.2
Starting with the consumption of political news, citizens following public affairs are
more involved than citizens not consuming respective information (McLeod, Scheufele,
and Moy 1999). News consumption can be a potential driver for preference formation
(Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith 2009; Schuck and de Vreese 2011; Gabriel 2013). Citizens
who actively search for political information are more inclined to participate and, in
turn, might be more in favour of direct and deliberative procedures that expand the
realm of participation.
Education is a key variable in the field of political attitudes. Empirical findings are mixed
and mostly refer to preferences for direct democratic procedures. Studies on Finland and
the Netherlands show that citizens with lower education are more likely to favour direct
democracy (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009; Bovens and Wille 2010; Coffé and Michels
2014). In the US there is no correlation between education and support for citizens as
decision-makers (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2007). Considering differences between pre-
ferences for direct and deliberative procedures, Landwehr and Faas (2015) do not identify
an effect of education among German respondents. Age can also play a role: Several
studies show that younger people favour participatory procedures and institutions
more strongly than older citizens (Dalton, Burklin, and Drummond 2001; Jeydel and
Steel 2002; Donovan and Karp 2006).
Research design
To test our hypotheses, we use individual level data from an original survey conducted
online in the UK in December 2018. The survey uses a sample of 1094 respondents
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(complete answers), which is representative at national level on several key socio-demo-
graphic variables. This ensures proportionality in the sample according to the most
recent census in the UK: area of residence (region), age, education and gender. The
high level of Internet usage in the UK (estimated around 90% in the year of the survey)
reduces to a large extent the likelihood of self-selection bias. The survey draws on an
online panel that includes a very large pool of respondents, which allows for a sampling
strategy that matches the general features of the British population. The survey was pre-
tested in October and November 2018. The questionnaire was designed by the authors of
this article and included specific questions about preferences for direct and deliberative
democracy, general political attitudes and political behaviour. The ‘do not know’ and
‘no answer’ options were treated as missing values and excluded from analysis.
The UK is the appropriate context to investigate preferences for direct democracy and
deliberative procedures due to their availability and use at different levels of government.
Two referendums were organized at national level in the last decade: 2011 on an alterna-
tive voting system and 2016 on Brexit. At the regional level several referendums have
taken place, mainly related to devolution and independence – in Northern Ireland, Scot-
land and Wales and in parts of England (in the North East and London). At the local
level there are many referendums and citizens’ initiatives. Deliberative procedures took
place in the UK, mainly at regional and local level. In the fields of local transport or
health public deliberation plays a crucial role. Another example, in Scotland the govern-
ment has recently revealed plans for a Citizens’ Assembly, while Edinburgh runs a partici-
patory budgeting for several years.
Variable operationalization
The two dependent variables of this study are the support for direct or deliberative pro-
cedures. They are measured as the answers provided to the following question ‘To
what extent would you like to see adopted and / or implemented at national level the fol-
lowing options, which give citizens more direct say in the UK politics?’. The wording ‘give
citizens more say’ does not include a certain bias towards direct democracy because delib-
erative practices also allow citizens to express preferences. The survey pre-test did not
highlight any biases in the direction of direct democracy. This question included two
forms of direct democracy and two forms of deliberative democracy. The forms of
direct democracy were the referendum and citizens’ initiatives. The latter are direct demo-
cratic instruments that do not necessarily end up in a vote on a policy. Nevertheless, they
follow the aggregation logic of collecting signatures in order to put a topic on the political
agenda. The forms of deliberative democracy were mini-publics and participatory budget-
ing.3 The available answers indicated preference for each of these forms and were
recorded on a four-point ordinal scale between not at all (1) and very much (4). The
answers about referendum and citizens’ initiatives were merged to form the support for
direct democracy, while the answers about mini-publics and participatory budgeting
were merged to form the support for deliberative democracy. Both variables are coded
on a seven-point ordinal scale ranging from 2 (not at all for both forms merged) to 8
(very much for both forms). The values of the Cronbach’s Alpha for each dependent vari-
able indicate high levels of internal consistency: 0.79 for direct democracy and 0.84 for
deliberative democracy.
POLITICAL RESEARCH EXCHANGE 9
Interest in politics (H1) is an ordinal variable measured on a five-point scale as the
answers provided to the question about how much interest respondents have in politics:
1 = not at all and 5 = very interested. Internal efficacy (H2) is also ordinal, operationalized
as the answer to the question about how confident respondents are in their ability to par-
ticipate in politics. The available answers range from not at all (1) to completely (5). Doubts
on parliament as the best arena for decision-making (H3) is measured on a six-point
ordinal scale (1 = totally disagree, 6 = totally agree) as the answer provided to the follow-
ing statement ‘Parliament is the best institution to decide on laws’. The satisfaction with
the government (H4) is measured through the following question: ‘Thinking about the
UK government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?’. The available
answers ranged between extremely dissatisfied (0) and extremely satisfied (10).
The doubts about politicians’ public interests (H5) is measured through the answer pro-
vided by respondents to the statement ‘In their actions UK politicians pursue mainly citi-
zens’ interests’. Answer options range between totally disagree (1) and totally agree (6).
Civicness (H7) is a six-point cumulative index of five dummy variables that measure the
involvement (coded as 1) of respondents into social, economic, cultural, political and
charity organizations. This item refers mainly traditional, hierarchical organizations but it
does not exclude newly forms of involvement. Respondents could decide whether
looser networks to which they belong fall under one of these categories. The question
asks them to explain whether they were members of groups, associations or organizations
in those areas. Experience with direct (H5) and deliberative democracy (H8) is measured on
a six-point ordinal scale as the answer provided to the question ‘How often did you under-
take the following activities (referendums, participatory budgeting or other kinds of pol-
itical consultations) in your life?’. The available answers range from never (coded 1) to
very often (coded 6).
The consumption of political news is measured as the answer to the question about
how often respondents follow political news on the web, TV, radio or newspapers. It is
a five-point ordinal scale that ranges from 1 (never) to 5 (several times a day). Education
is a four-point ordinal variable that ranges from basic/primary (1) studies to postgraduate
degree (4). Age has been recoded into four categories with the respondents up to 30 years
old in the first group, those between 31 and 45 in the second, those aged 46–60 in the
third and above 61 in the last one (for descriptive statistics, see Appendix 1).4
Analysis and results
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of support for direct democratic and deliberative pro-
cedures among the respondents in the UK. The percentages show that a very limited
share of respondents rejects the idea of direct or deliberative democracy. Only 10%, i.e.
the sum of the first two bars in the graph, answered that they would not want either refer-
endums or citizens’ initiatives adopted or implemented further at national level. Less than
15% have a similar attitude towards mini-publics or participatory budgeting adopted at
the national level. Overall, the British are quite favourable to direct and deliberative
democracy. This observation may appear slightly counter-intuitive at least for direct
democracy in the context of a highly divisive Brexit in 2016, which was ongoing at the
time of the survey.5 The positive attitude of many British towards direct democracy indi-
cates that they distinguish between the procedures of direct democracy and the outcome
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that sometimes is not favourable to them. In other words, few oppose direct democracy
even if they were not on the winning camp in the most recent popular vote.
The aggregate distribution of support for both direct and deliberative democracy is
quite similar. The correlation coefficient between the two preferences is 0.67, statistically
significant at the 0.01 level, which strengthens the idea that people have similar attitudes
towards the two types of participatory democracy. However, the individual level analysis of
the two preferences reveals that an important share of respondents have different atti-
tudes towards direct and deliberative democracy. In essence, we do not have the same
individuals in the same categories. For example, only one-quarter of those respondents
who want very little direct democracy (score 3) have exactly the same attitude towards
deliberative democracy. Similarly, only 30% of those who indicate that they strive for
more direct democracy (score 5) also strive for more deliberative democracy.
Table 1 presents the results of the bivariate correlation analysis between each of the
independent variables (plus controls) and the support for direct and deliberative democ-
racy. There is empirical evidence for all the hypothesized effects and with one exception
the relationships are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The first argument of our
article is that some features (H1–H4) favour support for both direct and deliberative
democracy. The support for hypotheses goes in the expected direction but the strength
of relationships differs. Interest in politics correlates highly with both support for both par-
ticipatory procedures. Dissatisfaction with the government correlates the highest with
support for direct democracy and internal efficacy with support for deliberative democ-
racy. The doubts that the parliament is the best arena for decision-making correlates
weakly (H3) with supporters of deliberative democracy and for direct democracy it lacks
statistical significance. Among the controls, people who are more informed are likely to
support both direct and deliberative democracy, while younger people support only the
latter.
Figure 1. Distribution of the respondents on the dependent variables.
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Our second argument is that, due to their different logic and principles, the support for
direct and deliberative democracy is driven by different factors. The evidence confirms our
theoretical argument and indicates that doubts raised about parliament as arena for
decision-making and experience with direct democracy correlate with support for direct
democracy. None of these two variables correlates with support for deliberative democ-
racy. Corollary, civicness and experience with deliberative democracy are associated
with higher support for deliberative democracy. Both are very close to statistical indepen-
dence relative to direct democracy.
Next, we run multivariate statistical models to test for the effects of these variables. We
use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. There are three
models for each dependent variable: one with the four general variables, the second with
the four general and the four specific variables, and the third with all variables plus the
controls. In general, the values of the regression coefficients in all three models confirm
the correlations but provide new valuable insights and nuances to the bigger picture.
To begin with the support for both direct and deliberative democracy (H1–H4), there is
empirical evidence for all the hypothesized relationships. Figure 2 includes the average
marginal effects for model 2; all statistical models are presented in Appendix 2. The
regression analysis indicates that the supporters of both direct and deliberative democ-
racy have interest in politics and have doubts that the parliaments are the best institution
to produce legislation. These are the two strongest predictors, see Appendix 2 for the
coefficients. Higher internal efficacy and lower satisfaction with the activity of the govern-
ment also lead to more support for both direct and deliberative democracy but to a lower
extent compared to the previous two variables. The effects are fairly similar and they
always go in the same direction.
Two immediate conclusions can be drawn. On the one hand, the support for direct and
deliberative democracy rests on similar grounds. The four variables have an effect in the
same direction and they are statistically significant most of the times. Our results contra-
dict earlier claims according to which disinterested citizens are more inclined to support
direct democracy, while the highly interested citizens may prefer deliberation (Bengtsson
and Mattila 2009). We show that political interest drives preferences for both direct and
deliberative democracy. Among the controls (Model 3) age is the strongest predictor –
also statistically significant – with younger citizens supporting both direct and deliberative
Table 1. Correlation coefficients with support for direct and deliberative democracy.
Direct democracy Deliberative democracy
Interest in politics 0.16** 0.13**
Internal efficacy 0.11** 0.17**
Doubts on Parliament as best arena for decision-making −0.04 −0.09**
Satisfaction with the government −0.14** −0.09**
Pursuit of public interest −0.08** 0.02
Experience with direct democracy 0.14** −0.01
Civicness 0.05 0.12**
Experience with deliberative democracy 0.03 0.18**
Consumption of political news 0.13** 0.07**
Education −0.01 0.05
Age −0.05 −0.15**
Notes: N = 1094. Correlation coefficients are Spearman (non-parametric).
**p < 0.01.
*p < 0.05.
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democracy. The prevalence of age in explaining support for the two alternative models of
democracy says something about their potential popularity in the near future, but also
downplays the negative effect of education on support for direct and deliberative democ-
racy. Since younger generations are more educated than the older generations, it is not
surprising that we do not find, contrary to earlier studies, a strong and significant negative
effect of education. As such, our findings confirm that participatory preferences are more
than populist tendencies of low educated citizens (Webb 2013; Bowler et al. 2017).
On the other hand, the comparison of the two strongest predictors for each model of
democracy indicates that the support for them lies on different grounds. That is stronger
evidence for the second argument that we make in this article. The variable about doubts
on parliament (H3) has a stronger effect on the support for deliberative democracy. Orig-
inally our argument was the other way around, we expected more doubt among the sup-
porters of direct democracy. However, the empirical evidence points into a different
direction. We interpret this finding as an indicator that UK citizens desire political decisions
to be deliberated and not just decided. They do not consider the Parliament as the best –
or the only – arena and prefer the inclusion of citizens’ perspectives and arguments. This
also goes hand in hand with the finding, that supporters of deliberative democracy have
doubts on politicians’ public interest (see below). Very likely, the supporters of deliberative
democracy want all arguments and interests to be taken into account in the will-formation
process – and they do not necessarily trust that parliament and politicians act accordingly.
The level of internal efficacy has stronger effects on preference for deliberation rather
than on those for direct democracy. In other words, internal efficacy plays a bigger role in
the support for deliberative and less in that for direct democracy. For deliberative
Figure 2. The average marginal effects on support for direct and deliberative democracy. Note: The
coefficients associated to this figure are available in Appendix 2 (model 2).
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democracy, the internal efficacy and doubts about parliament as arena for decision-
making are the strongest explanations. This finding goes hand in hand with our expec-
tation, which we can elaborate now. We assume that citizens with high level of internal
efficacy not only trust themselves to deliberate due to their feeling of strong communica-
tive and political competence. They also might have the impression that generally delib-
eration is a necessary step of political decision-making. For them politics is more about
finding the best solution. Being highly efficacious also most likely encourages the wish
and the demand to influence political will-formation and to make sure that citizens’ com-
petences find their way into and contribute to policies.
Moving on to the specific drivers of support for direct (H5–H6) and deliberative democ-
racy (H7–H8), the empirical evidence illustrates that experience has an important impact.
Individuals who participated in referendums are more willing to have direct democracy
procedures in place. Similarly, once they have experience with some deliberative settings
people are more likely to be supportive towards having them in place. These effects are
presented in Figure 3, which contrasts the support for the two types of democracy. It is
important to note that the British citizens who have experience with one type of democ-
racy do not show support for the other type. For example, respondents who have more
experience with direct democracy support deliberative democracy to the same extent
as those respondents who had no experience.
The evidence for the remaining two specific variables provides a nuanced understand-
ing of people’s attitudes. The doubts that politicians pursue public interests do not appear
to have an effect on the support for direct democracy. However, those people who believe
politicians pursue citizens’ interests support deliberative democracy. This is in line with
earlier findings and with practical arrangements according to which deliberation is
mainly a complementary of politicians’ work. Many outcomes of deliberation depend
on politicians to be implemented and thus a positive attitude towards politicians leads
to more support for deliberation. Supporters of deliberative democracy desire thoughtful
debates and meaningful input, and the involvement of politicians who pursue the public
interest could take the discussion to the level of decision-making. The latter would be able
to include deliberation that reflects citizens’ interests. Although supporters of deliberative
democracy do not consider parliaments as the best avenue for decision-making, they see
the politicians oriented towards citizens’ interests as an important feature of deliberation.
Civicness has a similar positive effect on support for both direct and deliberative
democracy. The theoretical expectation was a strong effect for deliberative democracy.
We had expected that citizens involved in community activities are more inclined to
debate in order to find best solutions. However, the effect is fairly small and similar to
what we observe for direct democracy. In itself civic engagement is not a crucial factor.
Engaged citizens do not necessary prefer deliberation. Several explanations are possible
for this finding. Citizens might be engaged in activities that are not dialogue-oriented,
e.g. some charity organizations, and accordingly deliberation might not sound too attrac-
tive for them. And even if they are engaged in talk-centred activities, they might have little
faith that deliberation has any effect. This would also explain, why civil engagement has in
the statistical regression the same effect on preference for deliberative as well as on direct
democratic procedures. Engaged citizens want to have more say, and they want more say
as well in political-will formation (deliberation) as well as in decision-making (direct
democracy).
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Discussion and conclusion
This article sought to explain why citizens’ support direct democracy and deliberative
procedures, using attitudinal data on British citizens. We advanced two arguments for
which we brought empirical evidence: (1) several general determinants have a positive
impact on the support for both direct democracy and deliberation and (2) specific deter-
minants could drive people towards supporting one of the two alternative models of
democracy. We have three sets of findings. First, there is broad support for both direct
and deliberative democracy among the UK respondents. Second, the support for both
models of democracy is driven in the same direction by the general variables: interest
in politics, efficacy, contestation of parliament and dissatisfaction with government.
Third, the supporters of direct democracy differ from those of deliberative democracy
in several ways. They are animated by greater political interest, dissatisfaction with the
government and experience with direct democracy. The supporters of deliberative
democracy rest more on contestation of parliament, internal efficacy and experience
with deliberative democracy.
The implications of this analysis reach beyond the single-case study. The empirical
findings bring contributions to the broader field of democratic preferences. The results
about the support for participatory decision-making processes are in line with most
studies in the field. Political interest and efficacy combined with political dissatisfaction
are crucial determinants for participatory preferences (Gherghina and Geissel 2019).
However, this is only half of the story since very few studies differentiate between
support for deliberative and direct democratic procedures. This is where the main contri-
bution of our work lies. This is one of the first analyses differentiating between these two
types of support and reveals that citizens who prefer direct democracy show partly
different features than those preferring deliberative democracy. Experience with one or
the other form supports the preference for the familiar type of participatory involvement.
Citizens, who support deliberative forms show more internal efficacy, which is intuitively
convincing, since they have more faith in their own abilities to discuss political issues. They
are probably more convinced of their skills to elaborate their policy preferences, political
interests, and values. They also have less trust in the abilities of the parliament to find the
best solution. In contrast, they seem to be more convinced that public deliberation would
be a better way of preparing political decisions.
Figure 3. The marginal effects of the experience with the two forms of democracy.
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One of the important methodological implications of our study is the use of specific
survey questions on participatory preferences. Our study shows that it is analytically fruit-
ful to differentiate questions on preferences for direct democratic versus deliberative pro-
cedures. British citizens show preferences for different participatory procedures and we
have no reasons to believe that such an attitude is country specific. As a result, the use
of specific batteries of questions in cross-country surveys could allow the capture of
cross-country differences.
These results may also bear importance for policy-makers. To ensure congruence
between citizens’ participatory demands and the participatory developments of a democ-
racy, it is crucial to know what the citizenry prefers. Policy-makers, who want to react
responsively to citizens’ procedural preferences need information about the interests
and wishes of the latter. In this sense, they have to know if citizens are satisfied with
the decision-making procedures purely based on elite decisions, if they prefer public delib-
eration while leaving the final decision to their representatives, or if they are more inclined
to decide themselves.
Our study is limited to citizens within the UK and future research will show whether our
findings can be generalized. A variety of cross-country surveys reveal that citizens around
the world demand more possibilities to engage in decision-making (Geissel 2016); this
indicates that the broad support for direct and deliberative processes is no British
peculiarity. Yet, little is known whether preferences of citizens for direct democracy
and/versus deliberative democracy vary in cross-country perspective and whether respect-
ive preferences can be explained with the same variables across several countries.
Future research may also go in a different direction and classify the respondents into
four types according to their preferences for direct and deliberative democracy: prefer-
ence for none, for one of them or for both. Such a typology could help coupling difference
preferences with behaviours. Along similar lines, the cross-national differences can be ana-
lysed by using both individual and macro-level variables. For example, citizens in consen-
sus-oriented countries might opt more strongly for deliberative procedures because they
consider debate and consensus as strong values. In contrast, citizens living in majoritarian
countries might prefer more say in direct decision-making, i.e. direct democracy.
Notes
1. For simplicity we use the terms ‘participatory’, ‘direct’ and ‘deliberative’ democracy to systems
with strong participatory features, which can be either direct democratic, deliberative or both.
These democracies are still organized in a representative setting and are not purely ‘participa-
tory’, ‘direct’ or ‘deliberative’ but provide comprehensive respective procedures.
2. We have tested for other potential controls identified in the literature as driving support for
direct democracy, for deliberative democracy or for both: ideology, income, medium of resi-
dence, media exposure. For example, ideology has been identified as a potential source of atti-
tudes towards deliberative practices (Christensen and von Schoultz 2019). We tested for
ideology both as left-right placement and party vote in the 2017 UK elections. None of
these appear to have an effect on citizens’ preferences. For reasons related to model parsi-
mony, we report only the most often encountered controls although some of these also fail
to produce an effect.
3. For citizens’ initiatives, mini publics and participatory budgeting respondents had an expla-
nation in brackets, in case they did not know what they stand for. The cognitive pre-test con-
ducted prior to the survey and the answers to other questions in the survey about direct and
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deliberative democracy indicate that respondents understood what they mean even when
they did not use them.
4. We tested for a series of other socio-economic characteristics such as income, medium of resi-
dence or gender. Their effects were neither strong nor statistically significant and thus not
included in the analysis.
5. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the support for these two forms is high in the country
even after the highly divisive referendum in 2016 about the exit from the European Union.
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis
(N = 1094)
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Preference for direct democracy 5.64 1.67 2 8
Preference for deliberative democracy 5.34 1.75 2 8
Interest in politics 3.51 1.17 1 5
Internal efficacy 2.41 1.20 1 5
Doubts on Parliament as best arena for decision-making 3.57 1.42 1 6
Satisfaction with the government 4.79 2.88 1 11
Doubts about politicians’ public interests 2.83 1.39 1 6
Experience with direct democracy 4.65 1.70 1 6
Civicness 0.71 0.68 0 5
Experience with deliberative democracy 2.18 1.46 1 6
Consumption of political news 3.16 1.30 1 5
Education 2.59 0.71 1 4
Age 3.55 1.64 1 7
Appendix 2. Ordinary least squares regression to explain support for direct
and deliberative democracy
Direct democracy Deliberative democracy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Interest in politics 0.15**
(0.06)
0.11** (0.06) 0.09* (0.07) 0.09*
(0.06)
0.08* (0.06) 0.07 (0.07)
Internal efficacy 0.10*
(0.05)
0.06 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 0.18**
(0.05)
0.12** (0.06) 0.11** (0.06)
Doubts on Parliament as




0.08* (0.05) −0.08* (0.05) −0.14**
(0.05)





0.12** (0.02) 0.10** (0.02) −0.04
(0.02)
−0.11** (0.02) −0.09* (0.02)
Pursuit of public interest 0.03 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05) 0.12** (0.05) 0.10** (0.05)
Experience with direct
democracy
0.12** (0.03) 0.15** (0.04) 0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04)
Civicness 0.04 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08) 0.05* (0.08) 0.06* (0.08)
Experience with
deliberative democracy
0.01 (0.04) −0.01 (0.04) 0.11** (0.04) 0.09** (0.04)
Political news 0.05 (0.06) 0.02 (0.06)
Education −0.06 (0.07) −0.03 (0.08)
Age −0.11** (0.04) 0.10** (0.04)
N 1094 1094 1094 1094 1094
R2 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.10
Note: Coefficients are standardized with robust standard errors in parentheses.
**p < 0.01.
*p < 0.05.
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